INTRODUCTION
During recent years, technology firm executives have been attracting more and more public attention due to the amount of compensation that these top executives are earning. As the United States recovered from the 2008-2009 financial crisis, technology firms became increasingly reliant on ballooned compensation packages to retain or attract high-caliber employees. In 2015, technology companies in America recorded expenses of more than $40 billion in stock-based compensation, which is roughly 60% more than the bonus pool distributed to the New York employees of Wall Street banks. Despite some anecdotes of high-profile CEOs such as Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and Google cofounders Larry Page and Sergey Brin opting for $1 annual salaries, CEOs of Standard & Poor's 500 Index companies in 2017 reportedly received average total compensation packages of $13.94 million, according to the new AFL-CIO Executive Paywatch. According to the New York Times, many of the 200 highestpaid CEOs in the United States during the same year ran tech companies.
Compared to traditional industries, technology firms are rich in abundant patents, new ideas, and intensive human capital investments. These new economy firms have distinct corporate features such as small board sizes and founder CEOs. However, the latter feature has endowed CEOs with strong managerial powers in regard to negotiating their own compensation with the board. This practice is especially controversial when businesses become stagnant and CEOs wielding higher negotiation power refuse to budge on their own pay. Thus, the unique attributes of technology firms provide a great opportunity to explore whether effective corporate governance mechanisms can constraint CEOs' managerial power to resist downward wage rigidity.
Downward wage rigidity refers to employees' resistance toward any reduction of their nominal wages; such rigidity prevents wages from being renegotiated even if economic conditions worsen. The phenomenon is often observed during economic downturns when union workers rely on their strong collective bargaining power to obtain more favorable compensation agreements with companies. A rich array of economics literature has addressed wage rigidity issues related to the national aggregate level of employees. For example, Elsby et al. (2016) and Daly et al. (2012) documented prevalent nominal wage rigidity during several U.S. recessions. However, what interests us most is the evidence provided by a microscope study that focused on a group of CEOs with high managerial power throughout a period of business downturn. We devote particular attention to hypothesizing that stronger negotiation power with shareholders may entail CEOs' wage rigidity during such downturns, especially in firms associated with poor corporate governance.
To shed additional light on the issue, this study reviews 890 technology firms that were listed on NASDAQ throughout the dot-com bubble and bubble-burst periods from 1997 to 2003. Our aim is to examine the magnitude of CEOs' wage rigidity within various corporate governance domains. Compared to traditional business leaders, CEOs in technology firms possess stronger power for negotiating with shareholders; such power theoretically lowers the chance of interest conflicts between management and control but may increase CEOs' wage rigidity during business downturns, especially in firms with poor corporate governance. We evaluate ownership structure; board composition; and the existence of independent compensation committees throughout the dot-com bubble and bubble-burst periods. We aim to examine during the business downturn period whether these CEOs cut their compensation effectively or exercise their negotiation power to protect their own benefit.
Contrary to the most literature, we don't apply the widely used executive compensation database known as ExecuComp. Instead, we collect corporate governance and executive compensation data from proxy statements through Lexis-Nexis. ExecuComp contains the firms in the S&P 500, S&P 600, and S&P 400. Within these 1,500 firms, the firms listed on NASDAQ only account for a very small proportion. Because our study collects compensation and board characteristics directly from annual proxy statements, we are able to code some variables that are essential but usually omitted from popular compensation databases; such variables include interlocked director seats and gray directors. Thus, this unique data structure enables us to fully investigate the various impacts of corporate governance functions on executive compensation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review, and Section 3 develops testable empirical hypotheses. Section 4 presents the methodology and describes the variables. Sample selection is provided in Section 5. We discuss the results in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , the separation of ownership and control may entail agency problems, that is, principals (shareholders) authorize agents (executives) to manage their firms; however, executives act in their own best interests at the cost of the shareholders' best interests. To align these two parties' interests, scholars have suggested that principals should employ incentive compensation and encourage executives to make corporate decisions aimed at the principals' value maximization (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988) . Many prior studies have examined the effectiveness of different compensation packages by estimating the direct link between management pay and firm performance. When optimal compensation plans are offered, pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) is generally expected to be greater. Abowd (1990) found that a 10% increase in managerial bonuses for good economic performance was associated with a 0.3%-0.9% increase in firm after-tax gross economic income in the following year; a payment increase of 10% for stock performance was associated with a 4%-12% increase in expected total shareholder return. Kumar and Sopariwala (2002) also discovered that profitability grows subsequent to performance plan adoptions. Similarly, Mehran (1995) found that performance is positively related to the percentage of equity-based compensation. These prior studies investigated the supposition that optimal managerial compensation packages tend to mitigate agency conflicts and consequently improve a firm's performance.
Strong corporate governance mechanisms may be another avenue of protecting shareholders from potential expropriations due to agency problems. Numerous prior studies have examined whether a firm's corporate governance (i.e., the composition of the board and shareholder ownership) influences firm value and shareholder wealth. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) found that firms with a higher proportion of outside directors usually perform better. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) concluded that a firm's performance worsens when the board includes a greater proportion of gray and interlocked directors. Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrated that when managers have higher shareholdings, they tend to align their personal interests with those of the shareholders.
Mixed evidence has been found regarding the relationship between incentive compensations and corporate governance mechanisms. One group of studies suggested that effective direct monitoring reduces the need for incentive alignment; therefore, incentive compensations are used less often when a firm's monitoring mechanism is strong (i.e., substitution relation) (Eaton & Rosen, 1983) . Alternatively, other studies have argued that strong corporate mechanism ensures the adoption of optimal compensation plans in firms and that PPS should be higher in such high-performing firms (i.e., reinforcement relation) (Baek & Pagan, 2006) . Supporting the substitution argument, empirically, the ownership of outside directors has been found to be negatively related to incentive-based compensation; a higher ownership of outside directors represents higher monitoring power for executives, so the use of incentive pay to executives is not necessary (Mehran, 1995) . More evidence has been presented in accordance with substitution relation: Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003) found that higher institutional shareholding leads to less CEO cash compensation; Ryan and Winggis (2001) suggested that higher blockholder ownership results in lower CEO option compensation. However, prior studies have also provided certain evidence in support of the reinforcement explanation. Cordeiro and Veliyath (2003) determined that the ratio of outside directors on the board has a positive impact on executive compensation; according to Yermack (1996) , companies with smaller boards of directors have low CEO PPS.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
While no consensus has been reached regarding the relationship between executive compensation and corporate governance, prior studies of the topic have been limited to large firms. Le Another governance efficiency indicator is the composition of the board of directors. Board composition is an important determinant of compensation policy. Core et al. (1999) found that less independent directors such as gray directors and interlocked directors lead to a higher level of CEO compensation. According to Core et al. (1999) , gray outside directors are "directors who or whose employer received payments from the company in excess of his board pay." Interlocked directors are commonly seen in the high-technology industry because of their unique expertise. Interlocked outside directors of Firm A are insiders of Firm B, and the insiders of Firm A also serve as outside directors of Firm B. Because the directors sit on each other's board, the independence levels of the boards are lower. Because interlocked directors lower the boards' independence, Core et al. (1999) suggested that a higher proportion of interlocked directors should have a negative impact on the monitoring mechanism. Taken together, gray directors and interlocked directors are expected to strengthen managerial negotiation power over compensation packages. Thus, the association between pay and performance is weaker.
The existence of a compensation committee indicates a board with higher independence in determining insider compensation. According to Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) , if compensation committee members are inside directors, retired employees, directors whose ages are over 69, gray outside directors, or interlocked outside directors, then the compensation committee is considered nonindependent. In such cases, compensation committee members are more likely controlled by CEOs and cannot exert their authority to independently determine insider compensation. Conversely, the presence of a more independent compensation committee signifies the greater ability of the governance mechanism to alleviate executives' influence overcompensation.
Overall, strong corporate governance generally involves a combination of high venture capitalist ownership; a small portion of gray outside directors and interlocked directors on the board; and the existence of an independent compensation committee. In contrast, poor corporate governance generally involves low venture capitalist ownership; a large portion of gray outside directors and interlocked directors on the board; and no independent compensation committee. Accordingly, we develop two testable hypotheses:
H1 
METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
We investigate the impacts of corporate governance on CEOs compensation in high-technology firms from 1997 to 2003, including periods before and after the internet bubble burst. To test our hypotheses, the following OLS regression is applied to examine the PPS of cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. Cash-based compensation is calculated by summing annual salary and cash bonus; stock-based compensation is the sum of option grants, stock, and other long-term compensation.
Accounting performance (return on assets, ROA in t-1) is used to represent firm performance. The coefficient, β1, is the estimated PPS, which measures changes of compensation given per unit change in recessions. We intend to examine whether nominal wage rigidity can also be found during the internet bubble-burst period. More importantly, will corporate governance mechanisms play an essential role in restraining the magnitude of downward wage rigidity?
Furthermore, we compare PPS between strong vs. poor corporate governance. We expect that the PPS will be higher in strong corporate governance firms than in poor governance firms, especially from 2001 to 2003.
Next, CEO characteristics and other firm specifics are incorporated into the regression for further analysis. We define CEO ownership (CEO OWN) as the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO; we also define CEO tenure (CEO TENURE) as the total years that a CEO stayed in the position. We define a dummy variable to indicate whether a firm's CEO was also the founder. FOUNDER CEO equals one when a CEO is the founder of the firm and equals zero otherwise. Prior literature has discussed other factors that affect compensation contracts-for example, Tobin's Q, Leverage, and firm size. Tobin's Q (TOBIN'S Q) is the market-to-book value of the assets of a firm and is often used as a proxy for the firm's future growth opportunities. A higher Tobin's Q indicates a firm's potential growth; as reported in prior studies, a growing firm is more likely to award more stockbased compensation to executives. Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) can be used as a proxy for external creditor monitoring or as a firm-risk indicator. Leverage ratio is defined as long-term debt to total assets. Responding to the substation and reinforcement relationships between monitoring mechanism and incentive compensation, past studies (Core & Guay, 2001; John & John, 1993 ) have reported both positive and negative relationships between leverage and CEO stock options. Prior studies also provided conflicting hypotheses about the relationship between agency cost and firm size in terms of total assets (ASSET). For example, Smith and Watts (1992) and Ittner et al. (2003) suggested that when a firm gets larger, the firm's operations become more complex, and its managers have more assets at their disposal; therefore, the possibility of agency conflicts in the firm eventually increases, and there is more need for the shareholders to use an incentive device to control their managers. Conversely, Murphy (1985) and Frye (2004) found that compared to smaller firms, larger firms receive more publicity and are exposed to more analyst coverage. Thus, publicity and analyst research reduce asymmetric information between managers and shareholders. In contrast, smaller firms gain less publicity, and shareholders face more difficulty with externally monitoring their managers. In addition, affecting a firm's value is relatively easier for individual employees in smaller firms than in larger ones; thus, the potential for agency conflicts is higher in smaller firms.
The effect of corporate governance on PPS is examined by interactive terms of governance dummies and firm performance.
Where VC = 1 for firms with venture capital, otherwise VC = 0; OUT = 1 for firms whose outside directors are more than inside directors, otherwise OUT = 0; INTERLOCK = 1 for firms with interlocked directors, otherwise INTERLOCK = 0; GRAY = 1 for firms with gray seat directors, otherwise GRAY = 0; COMP = 1 for firms with independent compensation committee, otherwise COMP = 0.
The significance tests of the interactive terms may reveal whether CEO PPS differs between strong and poor corporate governance mechanisms, and the empirical tests may also disclose which corporate governance mechanism is the most efficient for curtailing agency problems. As shown in Table 1 , the average CEO pay in the technology firms is about $1.35 million. Cash compensation is a small fraction of CEOs' total income (less than one-third), and the rest of their total income consists of stocks and options ($0.88 million). Compared to other industries, technology firms are more in favor of granting stock-based pay to their CEOs. According to Zingales (2000) , technology firms are unique because of their higher reliance on human capital; such human capital becomes the most vital component of these firms' values. In order to effectively manage their essential growth factor of human capital, options and other forms of stock-based compensation are especially important to such firms (Anderson et al., 2000) . Ryan and Wiggins (2001) suggested that options such as compensation encourage managers to undertake risky investment projects provided that managerial human capital is likely undiversified. Also reported in Table 1 , the mean total asset of our sample is $230 million, and the long-term leverage ratio is 8%. These statistics are consistent with the fact that technology firms are usually smaller in terms of assets and prefer issuing stocks to finance their growth. The Tobin's Q of 3.13 in the sample is higher than the general average of 2-2.5 across industries (Chen, 2006) . As to the descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables, venture capitalists hold an average of 10% shares outstanding; on average, six directors serve on the board; among these directors, 49.47% are inside directors, and 50.53% are outside directors; the majority of outside directors are independent; and less than half of the technology firms (0.36) obtain independent compensation committees. Table 1 also indicates that in 18% of our sample technology firms, CEOs are founders or cofounders of their businesses; on average, the CEOs serve 6.5 years in their positions and hold 7.90% of total shares outstanding.
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
Next, compensation and firm performance variables are further analyzed between the booming Table 4 shows the regression results of Model 2, with CEOs' total pay as the dependent variable. The evidence substantiates our wage rigidity hypothesis that during business downturns, executives of high-tech firms tend to exert their negotiation power with boards of directors over compensation contracts. The coefficient of ROA is positive in 1997-2000 but negative in [2001] [2002] [2003] . In order to unravel the relationship between corporate governance in compensation and firms' performance, we employ the interactive terms of governance dummies and firm performance into our regression. During the internet bubble, if ROA decreases by 1%, CEOs' total pay drops by $2,355. To be consistent with the principle of "accountability", the managerial pay is further cut by an additional $9,713, provided that the firm has venture capital shareholders. A discernible finding is that during the business downturn in 2001-2003, CEOs in firms without venture capital will earn an additional $1,273 for any 1% drop in ROA. The evidence substantiates our hypothesis that CEOs of our hightech sample firms tend to preserve their compensation while the economy is contracting. Should the venture capital owners have presented, the effects of wage rigidity may have been attenuated. As reported in Table 4 , when venture capital owners are present, CEOs have a net reduction in their compensation by $1,622 (-$1,273+$2,895). A higher proportion of gray directors indicates a less effective monitoring function by the board. The regression results find a negative impact of gray directors on CEO incentive compensations. Other governance characters about board compositions and independent compensation committees don't seem to play significant roles in influencing compensation plans. Consistent with prior evidence, our results indicate that based on accounting performance (ROA), CEOs tend to be paid more in firms of larger size (LNASSET), lower debt (LEVERAGE), and higher Tobin's Q. In addition, our results show that CEO OWN (the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO) is negatively associated with CEO compensation, which suggests that large CEO stock ownership reduces the need for incentive compensation. To further explore the puzzle that CEOs could earn more dollars when their firms' profits decrease after the internet bubble burst, we investigate the relationship of ROA to stock-based pay and CEOs' cash-based pay. Table 5 and Table 6 report the regression results of Model 2 -with CEOs' stockbased pay and CEOs' cash-based pay as the dependent variables. First, the results in Table 5 and  Table 6 corroborate the prior finding of Table 4 that the coefficients of LNASSET, LEVERAGE, and Tobin' Q are positive, negatively, and positively related to CEO compensation, respectively. These coefficients are signed by at least 5% confidence level. Second, in Table 5 Third, when all the proxies of weak corporate governance (VC=0, OUT=0, INTERLOCK=1, GRAY=1, COMP=0) are combined, both CEOs' stock-based PPS and CEOs' cash-based PPS are negative during the business downturn of 2001-2003. The evidence indicates that executives with weak corporate governance negotiate higher stock-based pay and cash-based pay rather than reduce their compensation in response to the poor firm performance. According to Kole (1997) Table 5 ), and CEOs' cash-based pay to ROA after the adjustment is positive (-260.96 + 602.33 + 294.85 -572.59 = 63.63; see Table 6 ). As shown in Table 5 , CEOs' stock-based pay goes down by $977.26 for 1% down in ROA. Given the strong corporate governance mechanisms in place, CEOs find preventing pecuniary penalties relatively difficult while negotiating their cash-based compensation during economic downturns. As shown in Table 6 , CEOs have a reduction of $63.63 in their cash-based compensation for 1% reduction in ROA. Thus, in firms with strong corporate governance, the CEOs receive lower pay for underperformance. High-tech firms may save their cash reserves to bail themselves out of the slow economic environment; accordingly, wage rigidity does not exist given this scenario. Overall, our findings are consistent with the premise that the attributes of corporate governance generally influence changes in executives' incentive compensations differently. In particular, CEOs of our high-tech sample firms are able to prevent severe pecuniary penalties for their compensation during economic downturns. This old tale of wage rigidity becomes more apparent in CEOs when the corporate governance mechanisms are poorly structured.
ANALYSES OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS
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ownership (CEO OWN) is the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO, and CEO tenure (CEO TENURE) is the total years that a CEO stays in the position. A dummy variable (founder CEO) indicates if a firm's CEO is also the founder. Logarithm of total assets (ln assets) aims to capture the size effect in compensation plans. Leverage ratio is defined as longterm debt to total assets, a proxy for external creditor monitoring or a firm's riskiness. Tobin's Q (TOBIN'S Q) is the market-to-book
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study offers detailed examinations concerning changes in CEOs' incentive pay in American technology firms throughout the dot-com bubble (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and after the dot-com bubble burst (2001) (2002) (2003) . Most importantly, this study reveals new evidence on the relationship between changes in CEOs' compensation and corporate governance based on contracting market conditions. Generally, our findings suggest that CEOs of high-tech firms are capable of preventing pecuniary penalties to their compensation during business downturns.
With a sample of 890 American technology firms, we hypothesized that for firms associated with strong corporate governance, CEOs' compensation should be closely related to firm performance; CEOs' PPS was expected to be high. Alternatively, for firms associated with poor corporate governance, CEOs may exert their negotiation power over the boards of directors to preserve their own compensation benefits. Thus, CEOs' PPS was predicted to be low and possibly negative during the bubble-burst period, thereby causing downward wage rigidity.
First, we find that the CEOs' total pay and the value of their stock-based compensations drop between the booming market (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) Fourth, the PPS was further examined along with the suggested corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, we explored how differences in ownership structure, board composition such as insiders vs. outsiders, independent vs. dependent (e.g., gray directors and interlocked directors), and the existence of independent compensation committees may affect the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Our evidence supports the notion that board composition is currently not an effective governance mechanism to curtail the extent of downward wage rigidity in technology firms. The board plays a vital role in monitoring and disciplining managers (Fama, 1980) ; however, given the complicated corporate strategies orchestrated by CEOs in tech industries, the effectiveness of a board's capability for scrutinizing a CEO is expected to dissipate. From this perspective, we argue that during economic downturns, managers may insulate themselves from pecuniary deprivation. We also hypothesize that CEOs' PPS is insignificant or even negative when firms have less powerful boards. Fifth, our results demonstrate that professional investors such as venture capitalists are more likely driven by selfinterest to closely monitor firms' management. Our evidence finds significantly stronger pay for performance associations in firms backed by venture capital investments.
This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by adding new evidence on how the effectiveness of corporate governance can lessen the degree of wage rigidity from high-tech firms' CEOs during a contracting market. Unlike traditional business leaders, CEOs of high-tech firms possess stronger managerial power in negotiating with boards of directors. Boards of directors in the technology industry are usually small. The CEOs in the high-tech firms are often founders or cofounders of the business. Such CEOs stay longer in their chief positions and hold a larger number of shares in their own firms. When business conditions worsen, all of these attributes intertwine with complicated strategic decision-making processes to enable CEOs to outplay the board in compensation negotiation.
What we learned from this historical review of corporate governance is that an old tale of wage rigidity indeed exists for our high-tech sample firms. The findings of our study also have practical implications. The impacts of corporate governance mechanisms differ across industries. In particular, the countervailing effects of high information asymmetries in high ownership concentration contexts require more attention in high-technology firms. Our findings suggest that boards should equip themselves in advance to face severe market correction. Van Essen et al. (2015) asserted that powerful (i.e., well-governed) boards have more influence over pay-performance compensation. Our findings insinuate that boards should recognize certain board configurations in order to empower themselves to curtail the immensity of wage rigidity when engaging in arms-length negotiation with CEOs.
